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Side-by-side portraits of President Donald Trump, left, and China’s President Xi Jinping, with each leader’s respective national flag in the background.

This combination of pictures created on May 14, 2020, shows recent portraits of China's President Xi Jinping (right) and U.S. President Donald Trump. (Jim Watson/Peter Klaunzer/AFP/Pool/Getty Images via TNS)

(Tribune News Service) — China was quick to condemn Israel after its assault against Iran. Yet President Xi Jinping has shown no sign of rushing to provide weapons and other support that would help Tehran face its most critical military test in decades.

Beijing has repeatedly issued warnings against escalation, calling again on Thursday for the U.S. and other nations to embrace dialogue and “prevent the regional situation from sliding into the abyss.” Despite that, China has yet to offer any material support to Iran beyond continuing its normal trading relationship, an approach it also took with Russia.

While Xi’s government has provided diplomatic support for Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine and shipped dual-use goods to Moscow, China has also been careful not to directly provide weapons in order to avoid U.S. sanctions. Beijing similarly urged de-escalation after its “ironclad friend” Pakistan and India engaged in their worst military confrontation in half a century.

“China may be offering economic relief and rhetorical support to Iran, but actual military intervention is not anywhere near the table yet,” said Wen-Ti Sung, nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. “China does not want to risk getting entrapped by Iran’s war with an Israel that has the Trump administration behind it.”

While the U.S. has a history of becoming embroiled in protracted wars far from home, China’s reluctance to get entangled in foreign conflicts is a hallmark of Xi’s foreign policy. That principle of non-interference has allowed Beijing to distinguish itself from Washington in the Global South, where it has pursued ties primarily by offering loans and development, while refraining from calls for political change.

Beijing’s approach toward Iran, as it faces attacks from Israel and potentially the US, mirrors that of its other major partner, Russia. Like Beijing, Moscow has criticized Israel’s attacks but done little to support Tehran. After discussing the Middle East by phone with Putin on Thursday, Xi issued a four-point proposal on the conflict that called for a ceasefire and to “stop the war.”

“It is up to the international community, especially the major powers that have a special influence on the parties to the conflict, to make efforts to contribute to the cooling of the situation,” he said, in a veiled reference to the US. “Using force is not the correct way to resolve international disputes.”

China has strengthened diplomatic and economic ties with Tehran in recent years, although it has no formal alliance with the Islamic Republic. Xi oversaw Iran’s joining of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization security club in 2023, and then its accession to the BRICS bloc — groupings Beijing has bolstered to challenge U.S. power on the world stage.

While Beijing signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement in 2021 that included a reported $400 billion in Chinese investment pledges, implementation of that deal has been weak. China’s economic interests in the wider Gulf region now far outweigh its economic ties to Iran.

Trade ties with Iran are heavily skewed in Beijing’s favor. China accounts for about a third of Iranian trade, while Iran represents less than 1% for China, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And while Beijing buys some 90% of Iran’s oil exports in defiance of U.S. sanctions, the Islamic Republic is ultimately a replaceable energy partner for the Asian country.

“In the unlikely event that all Iranian exports are lost, they could be replaced by spare capacity from OPEC+ producers,” Fitch Ratings wrote in a Monday note.

Already signs of a shift are emerging. As concerns grow over expanding secondary sanctions, Chinese private refiners have reduced purchases in recent weeks. Iranian oil flows into China fell to around one million barrels a day in May hitting a three-month low, according to data tracked by Vortexa.

While Beijing brokered a diplomatic detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, it has largely remained on the sidelines as fresh conflicts have unsettled the Middle East.

Iran, facing a superior Israeli military, would likely need advanced air defense systems and fighter jets — support that China is unlikely to provide. China has since 2005 officially ceased selling major weapons systems to Tehran, although the U.S. earlier this year sanctioned six Hong Kong and Chinese companies for allegedly helping Iran source drone parts.

Another option could be to help mediate. But even if Xi were willing, it’s unclear if either side would welcome him. Israel is unlikely to accept China after Beijing has aligned with the Palestinian cause. China also prefers to work through multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, rather than taking a leading role.

“Xi has expressed willingness to help. But what can he or China do?” said Zhiqun Zhu, professor of political science and international relations at Bucknell University. Mediating “is a tall order that’s hard to reach without cooperation of other key players, especially the United States.”

Perhaps the biggest risk for Beijing is the conflict spiraling into a regional war that directly involves the U.S. and could threaten China’s energy security. The world’s No. 2 economy is a net importer of crude oil, and about 45% of those shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

Surging commodity prices would also blunt China’s ability to stabilize growth, at a time when policymakers are already grappling with rising trade barriers and a yearslong housing crash that’s weighing on consumer spending.

“While Beijing will continue to condemn the conflict, it will also seek to balance ties with Israel and the Gulf states and promote stable energy flows,” according to Bloomberg Economics analysts including Alex Kokcharov.

A contained conflict that preoccupies Washington could hold one silver lining for Beijing, he added in a note Thursday: Greater U.S. involvement in the Middle East would “distract Washington from strategic competition with China.”

That calculation is reflected in the mixed views from commentators on Chinese social media, where some nationalist voices urged Beijing to help Tehran.

Political commentator Li Guangman argued Iran’s failure would be a “geopolitical disaster” for China. The fall of the Iranian regime would undermine Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, compromise the security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and allow the U.S. to regain control of regional oil, prolonging its “petrodollar hegemony,” he said.

Ultimately, Beijing prizes stability in its foreign relations and rarely supports violent regime change abroad, according to Neil Thomas, a fellow for Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

“China’s strategy in the Middle East is to stay on good terms with everyone to maximize its economic gains and geopolitical influence,” he added.

With assistance from Jing Li, Josh Xiao and Sarah Chen.

©2025 Bloomberg L.P.

Visit bloomberg.com.

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

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