The Trump administration is using a novel approach to increase defense spending. The Pentagon is relying on reconciliation, a special legislative process that expedites the passage of high-priority fiscal bills, to add money to programs underfunded in the base defense budget. Congress can pass reconciliation bills with a simple majority vote that, at least in today’s Washington, requires one party to control both houses and the presidency.

Defense hawks in Congress have criticized this approach since the White House’s request for the Pentagon’s base budget will keep spending flat through fiscal year 2026. If the 2026 midterm election results in a divided government, it is unlikely that the $1 trillion in defense spending the base budget and reconciliation request call for could be enacted again.

But the underlying problem with the budget is that the United States is courting strategic insolvency. Trying to maintain U.S. global military dominance has not only backfired geopolitically; it has also worsened the United States’ fiscal health. Fortunately, America’s geographic insularity affords it advantages that will not be undermined if it makes the right cuts and rigorously prioritizes among threats. Indeed, doing so would strengthen U.S. security by avoiding fiscal and geopolitical overstretch.

Ironically, hawks recognize that current spending levels are insufficient to support U.S. global military dominance. To support a “multiple theater force construct,” the congressionally authorized 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy argued for increasing defense spending to 3% to 5% above inflation. Hawks in Congress have also called for defense spending to reach 5% of GDP so the United States can take on the “axis of aggressors,” meaning Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

Advocates for vast increases in defense spending don’t usually discuss the unpopular trade-offs that would be involved, namely, higher taxes and cuts to entitlement programs. Nor do they explain how increasing defense spending to an arbitrarily determined percentage of GDP will “buy” the United States more security. Such arguments inflate the threat posed by hostile states and fail to prioritize among them. However, growing fiscal constraints are limiting the choices available to policymakers.

The nation is $36 trillion in debt and its debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 120%, an imbalance not seen since World War II that undermines the government’s credit worthiness and limits its fiscal flexibility. Annual budget deficits and rising debt are crowding out discretionary spending. In 2024, the U.S. government spent $881 billion on interest payments for the national debt, $31 billion more than it did on defense spending. If the nation continues down this path, the inevitable result will be a decline in living standards that makes Americans poorer, undermines the social safety net, and limits economic opportunity.

Even though the defense budget has increased annually, these funds are not necessarily delivering more combat power. The Air Force’s post-Cold War “divest to invest” strategy traded capacity for modernization priorities that ended up being too expensive to procure at scale. It’s the same story with the Navy, which pursued several ill-fated programs, such as the Zumwalt-class destroyer, Littoral Combat Ship, and Constellation-class frigate.

While the post-Cold War “peace dividend” necessitated some cuts to capacity, policymakers didn’t cut the number of missions. The deleterious effects of this mismatch were exacerbated by two decades of continuous combat operations in Southwest Asia. Money that could have been used for preserving capacity and supporting the defense industrial base was instead used for missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Global War on Terror accelerated the aging of a smaller Air Force and Navy, leaving the U.S. military ill-equipped to fight a protracted war in the Pacific where both services would play a leading role. Constant global freedom of navigation operations have also taxed naval readiness and led to severe maintenance backlogs that the Navy is still trying to clear.

The good news is that U.S. security will not be imperiled if it adopts a defense strategy that prioritizes among threats. America is a continental island flanked by two large oceans, abundant natural resources, and friendly neighbors. This geographic insularity gives the United States time to mobilize for crises abroad, as it did during World War II, and alleviates the need for permanent forward deployments.

Currently, there are over 200,000 U.S. service members stationed overseas to defend wealthy and capable allies and partners, many of which do not face existential threats. Despite its advantages in manpower and material, Russia has taken enormous losses and proven incapable of subduing Ukraine, never mind marching to Paris or Berlin. For all the fear-mongering regarding Iran, Israel eliminated most of its air defense network and top military leadership using airpower and intelligence operatives. Ironically, Israel poses a greater threat to its neighbors than Iran currently does.

Retrenchment in Europe and the Middle East would help the U.S. military focus on the region where its power is needed most: Asia. Chinese power in the region dwarfs that of U.S. allies and, according to Pentagon analysts, China is the only state with the “intent and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order.” U.S. forces can backstop the defense of Japan and the Philippines to maintain a stable equilibrium in the region. Elsewhere in Asia, however, the United States could afford to withdraw forces from South Korea, which has a robust defense industry and capable military that can defend against a North Korean attack.

The nation urgently needs to change its fiscal trajectory. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Adm. Mike Mullen famously warned 15 years ago: “[O]ur debt is the greatest threat to our national security. If we as a country do not address our fiscal imbalances in the near-term, our national power will erode.”

Self-destructive spending habits are more likely to impact Americans’ daily lives than a foreign adversary. Cutting missions abroad is the first step toward restoring fiscal sanity and ensuring the solvency of America’s defense strategy.

Matthew C. Mai is a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities.