President Donald Trump and his national security team wasted no time before celebrating their achievements at the annual NATO summit in The Hague. After years of underspending on defense and pressure from Trump administration officials, America’s European allies agreed to raise their defense budgets to 5% of GDP by 2035 at the latest.

Trump is quite pleased with the result and what he describes as his instrumental role in bringing it about. “In a very historic milestone this week, the NATO Allies committed to dramatically increase their defense spending to that 5% of GDP, something that no one really thought possible,” Trump proclaimed during a press conference after the summit concluded. “And they said: you did it, sir, you did it.”

Yet Trump should hold off on declaring victory. Getting allies to spend more money on their own defense is important, but it falls far short of Trump’s promise to reduce U.S. military commitments abroad. Bigger defense budgets from NATO allies mean little strategically for Washington if they aren’t paired with a reduction in U.S. security responsibilities on the Continent. If Trump really hopes to achieve the burden shifting he has called for, Washington must take real steps toward retrenchment by bringing home U.S. forces and putting NATO leadership positions in allied hands.

No fan of NATO during his first term, Trump returned to the White House seemingly ready to realign the U.S. military relationship with Europe quickly. Meeting with his European counterparts in February, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth left allies reeling, informing them bluntly that “stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe.” He called on Europe to “to step into the arena and take ownership of conventional security on the Continent,” a demand that shouldn’t have been surprising to the European dignitaries in attendance. Soon after, reports leaked of planned withdrawals of U.S. military forces and the transition of key NATO leadership positions, including the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) — the military chief of the NATO alliance — into European hands.

But just as suddenly, the Trump administration eased off the gas pedal. Warnings about U.S. troop reductions and calls for European independence gave way to a different, less radical message: Washington wanted Europe to spend more on defense, but underneath a continued U.S. security umbrella. During a trip to Europe in April, Secretary of State Marco Rubio offered reassurances to concerned allies. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker was more explicit in June: “The United States is committed to NATO — full stop.” Meanwhile, the Pentagon threw cold water on the most alarmist troop withdrawal predictions.

There are several explanations for the shift. Despite its rhetoric about pulling back from the U.S. role in Europe, the Trump administration may not have fully come to terms with the possible consequences of such a move. European musings about aligning more closely with China, canceling purchases of U.S. weapons, or building their own nuclear capabilities may have spooked the Trump team. In either case, settling for increased European spending could have seemed like a good compromise, a way to create an appearance of burden shifting and claim a win over free-riders without accepting any of the consequences of a true U.S. realignment.

The compromise, however, is a bad and dangerous one. First, there is no guarantee that Europe will meet the new higher spending targets in the 2035 timeframe agreed upon at The Hague. In fact, history suggests they won’t. European capitals often promise increases in their defense spending but have a poor track record of actually doing so. Some countries like Spain and Italy still have not met the 2% target that members first espoused over 15 years ago — Spain even negotiated an exemption to the new 5% guidelines on the eve of the summit, which Trump denounced during his NATO press conference — while others, like Germany, only just achieved the benchmark after Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in 2022.

Most NATO members acknowledge it will take time to reach the new 5% target. France expects that its mounting national debt will delay planned defense spending increases, for instance, and Germany’s proposed surge is dependent on its own fragile domestic political circumstances. The generous 2035 deadline means both countries may still meet their commitments, but it also means that U.S. security burdens in Europe will not decrease much at all in the near term and, in fact, may endure beyond the end of the decade.

Even if they do eventually find the money they’ve promised, European allies may not allocate their defense dollars in ways best suited to rapidly increase combat power or their defense sufficiency. Europe needs investments in air defense and artillery, munitions stockpiles, heavy armored units, small drones, and the enablers they typically get from the United States — air refuelers, logistics and sustainment, command and control systems, and intelligence. To rapidly scale their capacities in these areas, the Europeans will need to pool resources and invest heavily in their own defense industrial bases.

So far, however, they have favored large purchases of exquisite and expensive U.S. systems that will not arrive for up to a decade. Germany has just purchased new F-35s, for example, and Poland is looking to buy several hundred HIMARs and Patriot systems from the United States instead of looking to European or indigenous capabilities.

Even if Europe does defy expectations, NATO as an institution will still be dependent on U.S. power and leadership as long as Washington insists on being at the head of the alliance. This isn’t in the best interest of either the United States or NATO. Indeed, while the United States has an interest in keeping Europe out of the Russian sphere of influence, Europe has the capacity to achieve this objective on its own. Contrary to portrayals of Europe as a hapless bystander, in reality, it’s a rich and technologically advanced player that is increasingly taking the lead on issues it regards as critical to its own security, such as the war in Ukraine.

By keeping 90,000 U.S. forces in Europe or continuing to dominate NATO’s leadership positions and institutional infrastructure, the United States is more likely to discourage this transition at considerable expense to itself — even as it tries to prioritize other missions, including homeland defense and preventing war in Asia.

The Trump administration needs to define “success” in Europe differently. The U.S. objective should be to force Europe into making real strides toward defense self-sufficiency with the intention of eventual U.S. withdrawal, not simply to grow NATO’s defense budgets. The most effective way to do this is to set a timeline for the retrenchment of U.S. forces in Europe, at least 20,000 in the near-term, a move that would force European capitals to make real changes in how they think about their own defense.

The Trump administration can also support the transition to a more capable Europe by allowing Europeans to handle some of the most sensitive positions within the alliance. For example, the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR), NATO’s top military officer, has been in the hands of the Americans since NATO’s foundation more than 75 years ago. But there’s no requirement or need for an American to hold this post, and the fact that Washington consistently thrusts its own candidate to the front of the line suggests it either doesn’t believe Europe is competent enough to manage these high-level tasks or views the job as a way to keep Europe under its thumb. The recent nomination of U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich to serve as the next SACEUR was therefore a missed opportunity to change the narrative and adopt a low-cost reform to how NATO does business. The administration should not pass up similar opportunities in the future.

Every U.S. president since Dwight D. Eisenhower has complained about the inequities and power disparities between the United States and the rest of NATO’s member states. Trump still has a chance to stop complaining and actually do something about it.

Jennifer Kavanagh is the director of Military Analysis at Defense Priorities. Daniel DePetris is a Fellow at Defense Priorities.

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