With a major shift in the U.S. strategy for Europe unfolding, the key question is how the Continent will deal with its own security needs. Theoretically, the three major European powers (the U.K., France and Germany) should take the lead. However, although it’s the only continental state with nuclear weapons, France tends to talk big and act weak, preventing it from being able to play a leadership role in the future of European strategic command.

As U.S. President Donald Trump sat down April 26 to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the funeral of Pope Francis, they were briefly joined by French President Emmanuel Macron, who gave a warm handshake to Zelenskyy but left Trump’s outstretched hand empty. Earlier, commenting on Trump’s criticism of Zelenskyy, Macron told reporters, “American frustration should be directed at only one person: [Russian] President [Vladimir] Putin.”

On April 22 French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot told France Info Radio: “The only objective that concerns us is to defend French interests and European security. It’s the reason that, as the U.S. decides to place itself in a mediator position, we make them hear what our ‘red lines’ are.”

Like many nations, France is struggling to come to terms with the idea that Washington will no longer be doing the heavy lifting vis-à-vis global security and instead will rely on allies, partners and other players to establish a balance of power in their respective regions. For the past 80 years, these countries have never had to assume responsibility of such magnitude. Having long relied on American leadership, they let their own capabilities wither.

Paris must be cognizant of its limitations; however, it is still trying to position France as a great power, but without a real reason.

It gets worse: From Paris’ point of view, London is not just outside the fold of the European Union, it is strategically aligned with Washington. Moreover, the U.K.’s economic position has weakened (India in 2022 overtook Britain as the world’s fifth-largest economy, a position the Brits held for nearly a quarter of a century). For Paris the real competition comes from the Germans. While Germany is the Continent’s largest economy (and currently the world’s fourth largest), France is the bigger military power. The French are hoping to leverage this situation to dominate the future European collective security arrangement but are unlikely to be truly able to meet the future challenges.

NATO worked because the United States was its driving force, especially through the mechanisms known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). When it comes to establishing a European security architecture, France is no substitute for the U.S.

Importantly, America is a singular sovereign entity, while the EU is a collection of 27 sovereign nation-states. This makes collective action much more difficult. Additionally, the differences between Western and Eastern Europe are sharpening. Nations on Russia’s periphery have a different threat perception than those further westward and Poland, which itself is emerging as a major player, is unlikely to simply fall in line with French initiatives.

France’s historical track record is very telling. Since the rise of Germany as a major power in the 1860s, France has consistently lost wars against the Germans (the Franco-Prussian War, World War I, and World War II, in which U.S.-led allied forces liberated the country from Nazi occupation in 1944).

On the international stage, France could not defend itself in Europe and control its overseas allies and colonies at the same time. During the Cold War, French losses in Indochina prompted the U.S. to militarily intervene in Vietnam, a war that proved very costly and ended in defeat. The same happened in Algeria. In the post-colonial era, France has not been able to even maintain influence in its former colonies, with the Middle East being a key example. Recently, Macron took to compensating for France’s lack of effective action and influence by announcing preparations to recognize a Palestinian state, prompting accusations that the French are rewarding terrorism as Israel continues the battle to disempower Hamas in Gaza and free the hostages Hamas is holding.

Meanwhile, in the past five years France has been expelled from several of its former colonies in Africa, including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, with the last French base in N’Djamena, Chad, handed over in January. This retreat, driven by anti-French sentiment built upon Paris’ historical support for corrupt regimes and its failure to address African security concerns, has opened the door for rivals like Russia and China. Beijing has become Africa’s leading trading partner, with trade surpassing $173 billion (€152 billion) in 2024, focusing on resource extraction and infrastructure projects. This economic dominance allows China to secure long-term influence, often at the expense of Western interests. For the U.S., this threatens access to critical minerals and strategic ports, undermining its global supply chains and military positioning.

In essence, France repeatedly failed to play the role of a great power. The Trump administration must factor this into its calculus as it works to reach a negotiated settlement with Russia on the Ukraine War. Despite reducing its global footprint, Washington will need to develop a future European defense mechanism. It certainly cannot rely on France alone.

Kamran Bokhari is a senior director at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington. He is a national security and foreign policy expert and teaches a graduate course on Central Asia & Eurasian Geopolitics at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.