Cpl. Jae Hyun Kwon, a Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army soldier assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 210th Field Artillery Brigade, trains with a shoulder-fired weapon at Camp Casey, South Korea, May 20, 2026. (Bilal Brooks/U.S. Army)
South Korea is eager to set a target date for assuming wartime command of allied forces on the Korean Peninsula, while the United States insists the transfer should remain tied to military readiness, according to recent statements and media reports.
The apparent disagreement centers on whether Seoul and Washington should establish a transfer year before South Korea completes and validates key defense capabilities, including its domestically developed long-range surface-to-air missile system, according to a Korea Herald report Wednesday citing an unidentified Ministry of National Defense official.
Wartime operational control, or OPCON, refers to command of U.S. and South Korean forces during a conflict. Washington now retains that authority, while Seoul leads its military during peacetime.
The debate comes as South Korean officials push to accelerate the long-planned transition.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back said in a June 14 interview with broadcaster KBS that the allies are expected to propose a target year for the transfer to their presidents by year’s end.
A rocket fires from an M270A1 assigned to 210th Field Artillery Brigade during Freedom Shield drills in Rocket Valley, South Korea, March 17, 2026. (Ryan Reed/U.S. Army)
However, U.S. Army Gen. Xavier Brunson — commander of U.S. Forces Korea, U.N. Command and Combined Forces Command — told Congress on April 22 that the allies already have a roadmap to satisfy the transfer conditions by 2029 and cautioned that “political expediency” should not outpace military readiness.
Since 2017, South Korea has relied on the U.S.-operated Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, system to intercept ballistic missiles. Its domestically developed system, known as L-SAM, is expected to be deployed next year.
Seoul argues that plans to field L-SAM should be sufficient to establish a transfer timeline, while Washington believes the system must first be deployed and proven operational, according to the Herald report.
Ahn said July 1 that South Korea is prepared to expedite the transition and has already established the military capability, policy framework and public support needed to assume OPCON “immediately if necessary,” the Defense Ministry announced in a press release that day.
USFK does not discuss internal alliance deliberations or specific capability assessments regarding the transfer, spokesman Kim Eun-chong said by email Thursday.
The Defense Ministry cannot comment on the matter, but the allies are continuing to advance the transition “in a systematic, stable, and proactive manner, in accordance with the mutually agreed plan,” a spokesman said by text message Thursday.
The “real disagreement is not over missile defense,” but over how each side interprets the purpose of OPCON transfer, David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and retired U.S. Army colonel, said by email Thursday.
“From the U.S. perspective, OPCON transition has always been conditions-based because deterrence and warfighting effectiveness cannot be compromised for political timelines,” he wrote.
Some political leaders in Seoul increasingly appear to view the transfer as its own objective and would prefer to establish a target date, Maxwell added.
Command authority should be transferred only when it strengthens deterrence and combined defense, not “simply because a calendar says it is time,” he said, adding that Seoul demonstrating a high-altitude missile defense capability is not a new condition being imposed by Washington.
The transition process has always required South Korea to lead Combined Forces Command in the future against the full spectrum of North Korean threats, Maxwell said.
Cha Du-hyeogn, vice president of the Seoul-based think tank Asan Institute for Policy Studies, also warned against allowing “political calculation” to drive the transfer.
Given the likelihood that any future conflict on the peninsula would involve North Korea’s nuclear weapons, strengthening combined readiness should remain the alliance’s priority, he said in a July 7 interview.
A premature transfer could also “jeopardize the trust between the alliance,” he added.


