In this photo, provided by the French army on Jan 22, 2026, an oil tanker in the Mediterranean Sea that traveled from Russia is pictured after being intercepted by France’s navy. (Etat-Major des Armees/AP)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Ryan Nanartowicz is a policy analyst for American Security at the America First Policy Institute.
Each May, Moscow celebrates “Victory Day,” which typically showcases a grand display of Russian power. But this year’s parade was notably different. It was the shortest in recent history, lacking vehicles and missiles, a rare change not seen in 19 years. The heavy weapons traditionally paraded as symbols of that victory were absent.
Several factors contributed to this, with Ukrainian drone operations the most prominent. However, security concerns over the “near abroad,” Iran, and missile components due to U.S. actions also played major roles. Operation Epic Fury and subsequent strikes have directly challenged Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to threaten Americans and their interests.
Traditionally supportive of Iran, Russia is becoming increasingly isolated regionally, losing its key Middle Eastern foothold and reducing escalation chances due to the loss of a vital pipeline for military technology. Russia and Iran see each other as allies against the U.S.-led global order, with Russia seeking to regain influence in the “near abroad” and displace American influence.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the weakening of the Iranian regime is a cause for concern for Russian leadership. The Russians have reportedly not provided any tangible military assets, such as equipment, personnel or advisers, to support Iran’s defense. However, they have shared intelligence reports on American military positions with the Iranians, which have been crucial in identifying key targets for Iranian missiles, including U.S. carrier groups and personnel in the Arabian Sea.
It is also no surprise that Russian officials were vocal in condemning U.S. actions. Putin called Operation Epic Fury a “cynical assassination” and, with no sense of irony, a “violation of all norms of human morality and international law.” Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, has met with the Gulf States, China and Iran to voice Russia’s opposition to American actions, characterizing them as a “grave violation of international law.” Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia, voiced his displeasure on social media, tweeting “The peacekeeper is at it again.”
Relations between the two longtime allies have deepened in recent years, particularly amid the Russo-Ukrainian War.
Sanctions levied against Iran left it starved for economic relief, while Russia needed new assets and capabilities to overcome Ukrainian defenses. The Iranians had the technical expertise in low-cost, effective drones that Russia lacked and eagerly sought, as a recent paper details. Through Iranian trade intermediaries, the Russians obtained the blueprints, designs and components needed to produce Iranian-origin drones, including the Shahed series. The Shahed series is a class of kamikaze drones that have been used by Iran to target regional U.S. bases and energy infrastructure.
The Iranians and the Russians built production facilities within Russia to enable domestic manufacturing and ensure supply reliability for Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, Iran remains a critical exporter of drone components to Russia, despite Russia’s indigenization. Strikes on Iranian facilities put Russia under pressure to increase indigenization of drone production, affecting operations in Ukraine. Whether Russia can fully wean itself off imports remains uncertain. For now, it still depends on critical foreign-made components to maintain pressure in its operations in Ukraine.
Beyond its dependency on Iranian military hardware, Russia and Iran have developed complementary mechanisms to evade sanctions. As sanctions against both countries ramped up — in Iran in 2018 and Russia in 2022 — both developed shadow fleets to circumvent sanctions and remain economically viable, enabling them to pursue their regional interests. These Russian and Iranian shadow fleets are interconnected and operate under Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps authority; Iran’s shadow fleet has at times also operated under the companies, insurers and crews of the Russian Shadow Fleet (RSF).
U.S. actions against Iran place greater pressure on the regime and erode its infrastructure and capabilities; its economic lifelines, like the RSF, may also come into focus. With Iran’s already diminished naval capacity, the RSF’s routes and capabilities will also diminish. Given the history of Iranian vessels operating under the RSF, it is plausible that Russia could eventually absorb the Iranian Shadow Fleet entirely. This move would help preserve the RSF and its trade routes while also providing relief as U.S. forces continue to enforce sanctions against Russian entities that evade restrictions.
Recent fluctuations in global oil supply and prices could have further effects on Russia.
Disruptions in oil transportation through the Strait of Hormuz led some global consumers to temporarily turn to Russian oil as a short-term solution. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent temporarily eased secondary sanctions on Indian buyers of Russian oil for 30 days, aiming to lower prices for Americans as operations continue. However, long-term reliance on Russian exports is not the goal, as the United States and allies released a historic 400 million barrels of oil into the international market, lowering prices. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Bessent announced Operation Economic Fury, a naval and economic blockade aimed at pressing Iran, leveraging the straits, and keeping the RSF at bay.
The parade clearly illustrated the situation. Without tanks, missiles or the Iranian pipeline that supplies Shahed drones over Ukraine, Moscow’s display was just men marching on foot. Strikes targeting Tehran indirectly affected Russia. The empire that Putin dedicated 25 years to rebuilding has a soft underbelly, and it runs through Iran.