The Pentagon cannot afford to weaken veteran networks in Alaska

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Patrick McSpadden is a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel and former intelligence officer with more than 21 years of service, including multiple operational deployments. He writes on defense policy, military technology and national security. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Washington says it wants to support veterans and strengthen homeland defense. But the current crackdown on Alaska Native Corporation–linked 8(a) firms risks weakening both at the exact moment the Arctic and Western Hemisphere have become central to America’s national security strategy.

Kelly Loeffler, administrator for the Small Business Administration, has ordered sweeping audits and heightened scrutiny of the 8(a) program, moves that are already slowing and reducing new approvals. In selling these changes, she frames it as a way to open more opportunities for veterans.

In reality, it pits veterans against Alaska Native corporations that already employ them in large numbers and help sustain critical homeland defense missions.

Most veterans hear “government contracting” and immediately tune out. I get it. It usually sounds like a conversation built for lobbyists, lawyers, and people far removed from actual operations.

But this issue matters to veterans because it is not really about paperwork or contracting language. It is about people, readiness, and whether Washington understands how the military actually functions outside the Beltway.

The current National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy both place growing emphasis on defending the homeland and the Western Hemisphere. They point to the Arctic and North American warning and missile defense architectures as critical priorities.

Alaska is not some distant side issue anymore. It is the front-line terrain for homeland defense. That reality depends heavily on experienced support networks already operating there. Many of those networks include Alaska Native Corporation affiliated companies packed with veterans who never really stopped serving after taking off the uniform.

Former maintainers. Operators. Intelligence professionals. Logisticians. Communications experts. Veterans who still support radar sites, missile defense infrastructure, Arctic logistics, and military operations in some of the harshest environments in the country.

Companies like Akima and Chenega are overlooked in Washington. They’re the organizations D.C. takes for granted until they lose them. Roughly a quarter of Akima’s workforce and more than one in five Chenega employees are veterans. More than 40% of Akima’s active contracts are with the U.S. military.

These are veteran-heavy employers helping sustain real-world missions tied directly to homeland defense. They support operations in places where weather, distance, terrain, and infrastructure limitations can turn a small problem into a major operational issue fast. Anyone who has spent time around military operations in Alaska understands that immediately.

This is why the current push to aggressively squeeze ANC linked 8(a) contracting authority deserves a harder look.

Supporters argue these changes will create more opportunities for veteran-owned small businesses. On the surface, that sounds good. Veterans should absolutely have better access to federal work.

But that is not how this will play out on the ground. Weakening ANC contracting capacity is unlikely to create a wave of new veteran-owned firms suddenly winning major operational contracts in remote environments. More likely, much of that work will flow back to the same large defense primes already dominating federal contracting.

Veterans know how this goes. The smaller, trusted teams disappear. The barriers to entry grow. The large incumbents absorb more work. And the people closest to the mission lose out.

Many veterans transition into ANC-affiliated companies because the work still feels connected to purpose and mission. Supporting radar systems, logistics, sustainment, and operational infrastructure tied to national defense gives many former service members a way to continue contributing after active duty.

That matters.

Anybody who has left the military understands the strange feeling that comes with suddenly losing the mission, the team, and the sense of connection overnight. Strong veteran hiring pipelines into mission-focused work are not easy to build. Once they disappear, rebuilding them is much harder than policymakers think.

There is also a tendency in Washington to treat Alaska like a distant support area rather than an operational theater. That mindset is outdated. The Arctic is reopening strategically. Homeland missile defense and long-range detection remain heavily tied to installations and infrastructure spread across Alaska. Those missions depend on logistics, infrastructure, communications, and experienced teams that know how to operate in difficult environments.

None of this means the 8(a) program should avoid oversight. Fraud should be investigated. Waste should be cut. Veterans understand accountability better than most. But there is a difference between reforming a program and weakening operational networks the military already depends on.

Right now, Washington risks confusing political messaging with strategic thinking. The conversation around ANC-linked firms is too often framed as a culture war issue or a debate about contracting preferences. That framing ignores the practical reality that many of these companies already function as part of the defense support structure tied directly to homeland security missions.

Veterans understand something Washington often forgets: Readiness is not just aircraft, missiles, and hardware. It is relationships. Experience. Local knowledge. Teams that already know how to operate when conditions get difficult.

Reducing ANCs stake reduces veterans’ presence in the industry where they’re valued most.

As the Pentagon shifts more focus toward defending the homeland and the Western Hemisphere, this is not the time to weaken veteran-heavy operational networks already supporting those missions. Washington should fix what is broken without dismantling systems the military may suddenly need in a crisis.

Instead of sidelining ANC 8(a) firms, SBA and Congress should pair tighter oversight with clear guardrails that preserve their role in veteran hiring and homeland defense operations.