Internal security officers with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stand guard as a convoy of Syria’s Interior Ministry security forces arrives at Qamishli International Airport, eastern Syria, Sunday, Feb. 8, 2026, under an agreement aimed at stabilizing a ceasefire. (Baderkhan Ahmad/AP)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Alexander J. Langlois is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities.
With new reporting that United States plans to fully withdraw troops from Syria, the long-running U.S. mission in the country may finally be nearing an end. Still, many questions remain, especially given the long history of mission creep in Washington. In this regard, U.S. officials would be wise to see through their strategy, completing a full military withdrawal from Syria in the first half of 2026.
Per the reports, anonymous U.S. officials have confirmed not only the planned withdrawal but the number of remaining troops in Syria. Noting roughly 1,000 American soldiers remained, the officials said that a “conditions-based” pullout was in the works, likely over the next two months. That effort entails closing or handing over the few remaining U.S. bases in Syria — already an ongoing effort in President Donald Trump’s second term.
Troops have already left major bases like Al-Tanf in Syria’s south and al-Shaddadi in the northeast in recent weeks. Those moves come as the central government in Damascus and the previously U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) began advancing a ceasefire and unification agreement reached after a month of fighting at the start of 2026. Washington’s thought process here is clear: With Damascus joining the anti-Islamic State mission in November 2025, U.S. officials have focused on government-controlled areas, transferring primary counterterrorism operations to the Syrian army and internal security forces.
For the Trump administration, the Syrian war is over, ending any pretense for troop deployments to fight a generally domestic terrorist insurgency that can and should be primarily handled by the new government. This thinking is logical considering the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition defeated the terror group and denied it a physical caliphate in 2019. While there are real concerns about the group’s revival, the administration appears to be taking the necessary steps to ensure Damascus keeps ISIS at bay while continuing to provide support to the government that supplements its ground deployment.
Part of that process involves securing the prison camps holding ISIS fighters and their family members. To be sure, there are serious questions about this process, particularly ensuring basic due process and human rights for those held in these camps, largely without charge. Yet that issue does not negate the importance of ensuring an organized process for these individuals as opposed to risking major prison breaks that could bolster efforts to reconstitute ISIS. Both issues can and should be addressed in parallel.
The other aspect of that process necessitates coordination and intelligence sharing with Damascus. The U.S. has already conducted joint operations with the new authorities against ISIS, testing the central government’s capacities. Washington can and should continue to provide this support from a distance in the ongoing fight to prevent an ISIS resurgence.
In this context, Washington will benefit from its new counterterrorism partner in the Middle East, saving substantial resources along the way. That says nothing of the importance of improved relations with Turkey, another partner in the region with a strong interest in preventing the reconstitution of ISIS. That relationship has long been strained due to the close U.S. relationship with the SDF, which holds strong connections to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party — Ankara’s non-state archrival.
Equally important, especially amid potential war with Iran, is repositioning these troops from their exposed forward bases in Syria’s northeast. For years, these locations served as easy targets for Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” network of non-state armed groups. Their potential role as a trigger for conflict with Tehran, or as easy targets in any full-scale conflict with the Islamic Republic, offers more than enough grounds for Washington to shift course once and for all.
Given these benefits, Washington should continue and complete the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria. The Trump administration has wisely tried to resolve differences between Damascus and the country’s various minority groups, who fear a Sunni-dominated government that could opt to repress them in a fashion like that of the previous Assad regime. It can continue to do so at little cost and without troops on the ground. The United States under Trump values strong central states as direct partners to advance U.S. interests and should continue to do so with Syria’s stability, unity and sound transition in mind — especially considering the potential external repercussions of any renewed, full-scale war in the country.
With the SDF question now largely sunsetting — albeit with plenty of space to falter — Washington is moving in the right direction so long as it centralizes these basic principles. Still, given the conditions-based nature of its pullout, a deployment situation akin to Iraq could possibly mark Syria’s near-term future. In that context, a small contingent of U.S. troops remains in northern Iraq’s Irbil. Time will tell just how much of a true and complete withdrawal occurs in Syria, but one fact is certain — it has been a long time coming.