ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Lyle Goldstein is director of Asia Engagement at Defense Priorities.

In late September, the Chinese navy made public the remarkable tests of its new Fujian aircraft carrier, sparking alarm that Beijing had drawn even with or even ahead of the U.S. Navy in the key technology of electromagnetic (EMG) catapults.

Such rapid progress has sent some quarters of Washington into a panic. However, the fundamentals of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific are stable and continue to favor the U.S. by a fair margin. China’s aircraft carriers are glamorous, to be sure, but they wouldn’t be especially useful in the region’s biggest potential flashpoint: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Nor do they pose a threat to U.S. national security.

The Fujian launched not one but three new types of aircraft from its EMG catapults. That’s a startling technological accomplishment, given that the U.S. Navy is the only other force in the world that operates EMG catapults. The U.S. version has proven somewhat disappointing so far in that it cannot yet launch the U.S. Navy’s F-35C, which is hoped to be the standard carrier-based fighter in coming decades.

In lofting the J-35 into the air, it seems China became the first country to use EMG catapults to launch a fifth-generation fighter. Another strike fighter, the J-15T, also made its debut. While the latter jet is somewhat known, the tandem of the J-35 and J-15T is expected to form a respectable pair of combat aircraft. This is especially true as they wield the highly effective YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missile as well as impressive air-to-air missiles.

Still, it’s not the sleek combat jet but the lumbering, propeller-driven KJ-600 that stole the show. Why? This plane is an airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft with a radome on top, reminiscent of America’s large AWACS planes and looking remarkably similar to the U.S. Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye. Such aircraft are key not only to modern aerial warfare, allowing for long-range radar detections and effective battle management in the missile age, but to protecting aircraft carrier battle groups from aerial and missile threats.

Until the Chinese navy released videos of its EMG testing of the KJ-600, no other navy in the world besides the U.S. Navy could loft such heavy aircraft. That gave American aircraft carriers an enormous intelligence and battle management advantage. This advantage no longer exists.

The advantages of EMG catapults go beyond even the launch of the KJ-600. For strike fighter aircraft, such as the J-35 and J-15T, it means they can fly farther and loft heavier payloads of weapons. In modern aerial combat, these are hardly minor issues. EMG catapults also promise more rapid and reliable launches.

These are impressive strides, but it’s still hard to see how aircraft carriers would help Beijing in a Taiwan contingency — the scenario that obsesses Chinese strategists. Indeed, China’s People’s Liberation Army already possesses a plethora of air and missile bases close to the island, so “flattops” are just not needed to secure that crucial airspace.

Chinese aircraft carriers could conceivably be employed to extend anti-aircraft and anti-submarine screens to the northeast and southeast of the island. For the important undersea fight, Beijing’s carriers could provide fighters to guard key airspace, enabling anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters to hunt U.S. and allied submarines.

An alternative and even riskier use of Chinese aircraft carriers in a Taiwan scenario would be to adopt a “raiding strategy,” launching strikes against U.S. bases, for example on Guam, or even attempting to break out into the mid-Pacific to strike at America’s lengthy supply lines. Such a strategy might succeed in distracting the U.S. Navy away from the Taiwan Strait, but it would also likely result in the sinking of China’s aircraft carriers.

As I detail elsewhere, Taiwan is an exceedingly tough problem for the U.S. military with or without Chinese aircraft carriers, because of China’s dual advantages of both proximity and national will. Thus, in the above vignette, China might have its carrier forces sunk but still succeed in conquering Taiwan, a decent trade from Beijing’s perspective. American strategists would do well to recognize that Taiwan does not constitute a vital interest for the U.S. worth a great power war.

Do Chinese carriers represent a hazard to U.S. treaty allies like Japan and the Philippines? Could they even mount attacks against U.S. territory in the central or eastern Pacific? It’s unlikely. Carrier forces use enormous amounts of fuel and munitions, and China lacks a basing infrastructure to support such expeditionary carrier operations over an extended period. Not only does China still have a paltry number of carriers, but the Chinese navy’s fleet of oilers is limited and would constitute vulnerable targets for U.S. forces.

China’s experience in major naval combat is minimal, to say the least, and they lack credible defenses against U.S. submarines that have a qualitative edge. Both Japan and the Philippines have extensive strategic depth that Taiwan lacks.

Substantial new research indicates that Beijing evinces little desire to project power far afield. Let’s all take a deep breath and recognize that Chinese naval development, which does bear watching, does not threaten U.S. national security now or in the foreseeable future.