An Air Force F-35A Lightning II trains during the Lonestar Lightning exercise at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth in Texas, July 16, 2025. (Reagan Hardy/U.S. Air Force)
By Wes Martin
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Wes Martin, a retired U.S. Army colonel, has served in law enforcement positions around the world and holds an MBA in International Politics and Business.
The American aviation industry is the envy of the world, the exemplar of innovation and production capabilities. It provides the backbone for international airlift capacity for global commerce.
Yet beneath the gleaming, ever-stronger, ever lighter fuselages lies a vulnerability: a need for a reliable supply chain of high-grade titanium. It is not just another industrial metal, it is one of 35 mineral commodities vital to U.S. economic and national security interests.
The Boeing 787 Dreamliner, for example, uses nearly 15% titanium by weight. Fighter jets like the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II incorporate it even more extensively, especially in areas where structural integrity under stress is paramount. The last domestic production plant, in Nevada, closed in 2020.
Today all of our supply is imported. The reliance on imported titanium metal requires clarity and truth-in-labeling in the marketplace because not all titanium is created equal.
American aerospace and medical companies require high-grade titanium metal, specialized production processes and rigorous quality controls. The international competition for this commodity is robust, making room for more than a little mischief in source labeling. Some suppliers are working to align political correctness and their commercial interests by obscuring nation of origin by shipping through intermediary countries. Changing bills of lading through Scandinavia or elsewhere doesn’t advance our national interests. Political correctness aside, the simple fact is that on this planet the critical titanium deposits are beneath Saudi Arabia and Russia.
Some in the European Union and American political class find cause to clutch their pearls at the mention of some of those countries and prefer to send a message to them through sanctions. That position doesn’t advance our respective vital interests given the limited diversity of supply sources. Policymakers in Washington and Brussels have an opportunity to place higher value on the truth about the strategic metals supply chain by not retreating under political pressure to sanction the few genuine sources feeding global demand.
Aviation and medical titanium materials cannot simply be swapped out overnight. This is not a matter of corporate convenience or shareholder profit but of honest commerce and supply chain logistics. Under sanctions, Al Capone era economics will force up the price of strategic metals, and create bottlenecks and snarls by criminalizing the current commercial mechanics.
The resulting production slowdowns will squeeze defense contractors. It will incentivize secondary markets out of view of current quality control standards, incentivize relabeling through third nations such as the Netherlands or others, and add chaos without a countervailing benefit. They must resist the temptation of symbolic gestures without first ensuring alternatives.
Policymakers can have it both ways by ensuring access to aerospace titanium now while building resilient and diversified supply chains for the future. Just as the U.S. has worked to secure rare earth minerals with global partners, titanium should be included in a national industrial strategy. This means accelerating investment in domestic aerospace-grade titanium production in places like Tennessee, advancing metallurgical research, and incentivizing private development that meets aviation certification standards. While these steps will take years to bear fruit, anything less risks turbulence the industry cannot afford.
Cooperative ventures with trusted partners can help diversify supply without the negative externalities associated with political sanctions. The success of current industrial strategy depends on safe, reliable supply from Russia and Saudi Arabia and others without regard to the critics’ concerns over optics. This is not a concession to partners with whom we disagree, it’s a commitment to the same national strategy that ended the Cold War and opened mainland China: commercial and cultural intercourse. Democracy and capitalism cannot prevail in isolation.