BAGHDAD — Soldiers with Company C, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry had a low-tech weapon to combat insurgent groups when they ventured into a city just outside Abu Ghraib on Oct. 10. The key pieces of equipment were stacks of flyers no different than those used to advertise an upcoming house party.

In this case, though, they encouraged Iraqis to help the Americans kick out insurgent groups.

The leaflets are part of an "IO," or information operations, campaign to counter growing insurgent activity around Abu Ghraib.

Insurgent groups have been blowing up homes around the area, though, and that act sends its own message: Stay out.

"It’s kind of like their own little IO campaign," said Sgt. 1st Class Kenneth Palumbo.

Abu Ghraib has been hit by 24 house bombs since July. The bombs target the 1,000 to 3,000 families — many of them Shiite — who have returned to the Sunni-dominated area after hearing that it has settled down.

In many cities, bombs that target returning families are barely large enough to destroy a home’s front gate. But the Abu Ghraib bombs have demolished entire homes.

While soldiers fear the bombs could hurt someone or prevent a return to normalcy, the bigger fear is that they could trigger a return to the vicious sectarian fighting of 2006.

In this scenario, Sunni extremists target Shiite homes to keep them from returning.

In response, Shiites would band together in militias for protection and attack Sunnis. This would then prompt regular Sunnis to seek their own protection with extremist groups like those who started the fighting in the first place.

Abu Ghraib could eventually spiral into chaos as each side took turns avenging the wrongs against it.

It’s the job of American soldiers like those in Company C to ensure this doesn’t happen.

The Abu Ghraib area is about 70 percent Sunni, with a few scattered Shiite communities.

The city is the western gate to Baghdad, said Lt. Col. Mario Diaz, commander of 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, the unit to which Company C is attached.

Abu Ghraib has historically been the supply route into the capital. Al-Qaida in Iraq used the area to move weapons and fighters, which forced many Shiites to flee the area.

The area is a "pivot point" for Iraq.

It can either bridge the Sunni west with the Shiite-dominated capital, or it can mark the rift between the two sides.

"As coalition forces, it took us a while to recognize that," Diaz said.

"The Government of Iraq and tribal leaders and the Iraqi people already knew that."

The Iraqi army recently completed "Operation Bat," a monthlong operation targeting house bombs. Across Baghdad, it is the job of Iraqi units to help families return to their homes.

This works well in many places because the units either have an even mix of Sunnis and Shiites, or they share the area with coreligionists.

Yet the Iraqi unit that controls Abu Ghraib is 70 to 75 percent Shiite, although led by a Sunni commander who has the ear of Iraq’s Shiite prime minister. In this strained environment, just doing its duty can create sectarian tensions.

"It’s a process that requires — at the ground level — someone knocking on the door and saying, ‘In three days this home has to be unoccupied because the owners have identified this as theirs with a land deed,’ " Diaz said.

The Iraqi government frequently moves around most Iraqi units, but the Muthana Brigade — as the 24th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division is known — has been in the area for three years.

Over time, it’s developed a history of tension with Abu Ghraib residents and it doesn’t yet have the Americans’ appreciation for precision targeting, Diaz said.

"If the Muthana Brigade is tough with us, I think the terrorists will come back," one man told the Americans. "If you help me, I will help you. But if you work against me, I will work against you."

The most serious complaint is Iraqi soldiers arresting people without cause. Diaz said the vast majority of these complaints are unsubstantiated. His soldiers hear them constantly.

But when they press for details about who was arrested and when, they invariably learn that it happened to an unspecified friend of a friend.

In rumor-rich Iraq, though, perception can be reality. Sunni residents are apt to perceive sectarian motives whenever they see Shiite soldiers evict their Sunni neighbors, even if those neighbors are squatters.

That’s especially true since many of the squatters are both victims and perpetrators. They often fled their own homes in Shiite-dominated areas.

Simply kicking them out doesn’t solve the problem, because they have nowhere else to go. They may not be able to return home, and there aren’t enough available houses. Many just take up residence in another abandoned home.

The community is working to counter these problems.

Returning families often receive celebrations and media coverage, Diaz said.

Sometimes Sunni tribal leaders will speak at events for returning Shiites.

But much of the work is left to the Americans. Intelligence teams hit the streets to develop sources who can help them prevent the attacks.

Other soldiers pass out stacks of leaflets that rebut rumors and exhort residents to throw out the insurgents.

"We are basically telling people, ‘Hey! If you want this out of your neighborhood, help us out,’ " said Staff Sgt. Jacey Callahan.