The USS Harry S. Truman sails in the Atlantic Ocean on Sept. 23, 2025. (Michael Shen/U.S. Navy)
WASHINGTON — Insufficient communication, low level of knowledge for certain operations and the lack of integrated training were factors involved in the four accidents during the USS Harry S. Truman’s deployment, the Navy said in its reports on the investigations released Thursday.
One incident, a collision with a merchant vessel in February, “could have caused catastrophic results,” the Navy concluded.
The Truman sailed 24,000 nautical miles across Europe and the Middle East during the eight months it was deployed. The four mishaps took place from December 2024 to May 2025.
During deployment, the crew conducted 50 days of continuous strikes, including the launch of Tomahawk land attack missiles and precision airstrikes, meant to degrade Houthi capabilities and disrupt threats to commercial shipping. The Truman fired more than 1.1 million pounds of ordnance against enemy targets. Of that, 125,000 pounds were launched against Islamic State terrorists in northeast Somalia in what the Navy called the largest airstrike in history launched from an aircraft carrier.
“The Navy’s sustained combat operations in the U.S. Central Command area of operations for the past two years demonstrated our battle effectiveness and ability to maintain freedom of navigation,” Adm. James Kilby, vice chief of naval operations, said in a statement. “As we reflect on these incidents and ongoing improvement efforts, the Navy remains laser-focused on producing battle ready sailors and forces to ensure the Navy provides our nation with the most lethal, combat-credible, and ready force possible.”
The four individual investigations focused on lost aircraft and a tow tractor, the collision and a case of friendly fire involving the carrier and its strike group. The four preventable mishaps cost the Navy more than $100 million as well as multiple injuries.
Sailors also told investigators that they felt the strain of “a pressurized schedule and a culture of ‘just get it done.’ ”
On May 6, an F/A-18F Super Hornet was lost in the Red Sea after attempting to land on the aircraft carrier at 8:46 p.m. local time. According to interviews and the pilot’s landing aid camera recording, the fighter jet’s approach appeared normal until it caught the cross-deck pendant wire.
Witnesses heard a loud boom and saw sparks and flames, according to the report. The investigation found that a cable designed to bring the 50,000-pound jet to a halt in just a few hundred feet snapped mid-landing.
The aircraft was unable to stop on the flight deck and did not have enough airspeed to take flight before hitting the Red Sea, the report says. The pilot and weapons systems officer ejected from the two-seat aircraft and were recovered by a rescue helicopter, suffering only minor injuries.
Damage was estimated at more than $60 million.
The report stated that a low level of knowledge among certain operators and crew, including the sheave damper operator and arresting gear personnel, contributed to the incident.
The investigation also noted there was a malfunction in the No. 4 starboard sheave damper, the hydraulic shock absorber used in arresting gear systems to reduce tension and vibration in the cable.
Aircraft, towing tractor go overboard
On April 28, an F/A-18E Super Hornet and a towing tractor were lost overboard on Hangar Bay 3 of the Truman during an evasive maneuver to avoid an incoming medium range ballistic missile.
Fighter jets are routinely towed across the hangar deck to park them for flight operations or other work. The carrier made a “hard turn,” a defense official said at the time, though it wasn’t enough on its own to cause a $67 million Navy fighter jet to slide off a ship.
At the time, the Truman had been traveling at “135 degrees true at approximately 15 knots” in the Red Sea when the ship received a report of an inbound missile and began the maneuvers.
The junior officer of the deck desired a greater turn rate and ordered an increase in the rudder angle, causing the ship to tilt at a faster rate. The bridge team noticed and attempted to mitigate by easing the rudder back.
At the same time, the wheel chocks and tiedown chains were removed from the aircraft in order to pull it forward into the hangar bay to close the deck edge doors. The investigation determined that about eight seconds after the ship hit maximum tilt, the aircraft and tow tractor slid out of the hangar bay.
“Multiple interviews revealed inadequate communication of the upcoming turn from bridge to flight deck control and hangar bay control. Proper communication would likely have resulted in [the aircraft] remaining tied down to the hangar bay deck through Truman’s evasive turn, as the standard operating procedure now codifies,” the report says.
Ten recommendations were listed regarding the incident, but “the investigation determined the Truman’s changes to standard operating procedure since the April 28 incident adequately address the re-prioritization of hangar bay priorities and will significantly decrease the likelihood of similar incidents in the future.”
On Feb. 12 at 11:45 p.m. local time, the Truman — five months into its operational deployment — collided with a merchant vessel in the vicinity of Egypt’s Port Said. There were no injuries to crews of the Truman or the Besiktas-M, a bulk cargo carrier sailing under the flag of Panama.
The Besiktas-M struck the starboard quarter of the Truman. The damage was all above the waterline, and the Truman navigated to safe waters after the collision.
The Truman established communications with the security control accessor and learned the Besiktas-M “anchored after collision, reported no engineering or personnel casualties, and requested no assistance,” according to the report.
Damage to the USS Harry S. Truman as viewed from a rigid-hull inflatable boat on Feb. 13, 2025. The aircraft carrier was involved in a collision with the cargo vessel Besiktas-M a day earlier while operating in the vicinity of Port Said, Egypt. (Cody Beam/U.S. Navy)
The Truman returned on Feb. 16 to Souda Bay, Greece, to conduct damage assessment and temporary repairs. A final cost assessment was not included in the report.
The results could have been “catastrophic,” the investigation concluded, if there had been small change in the path of the ship.
Eight sailors were in a space less than 10 feet from the impact location. A 1-degree change in trajectory could have destroyed the space and caused eight fatalities.
“My team spoke with those eight sailors, and they will never forget how close they came to losing their lives. Neither should we,” the report says.
The incident was avoidable, the report concluded.
Capt. Dave Snowden, commander of the Truman, was relieved of duty after the incident.
The Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group entered the Red Sea on Dec. 14, 2024, and quickly conducted its first defensive strike against Houthi positions.
On Dec. 22, the commanding officer of the USS Gettysburg and combat information center team fired missiles at two friendly F/A-18Fs. The troops from one jet ejected before the missile struck, and the ship stopped the second missile shortly before impact. The Gettysburg targeted but did not fire at a third friendly aircraft, according to the report.
“The decisions to shoot were wrong when measured across the totality of information available to the [Gettysburg commanding officer]. Constrained by a series of previous actions and decisions, the commanding officer had low situational awareness, and his [combat information center] team was unable to help him regain it,” the report says.
The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG 64) sails in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility in February 2025. (Kaitlin Young/U.S. Navy)
In the hours leading up to the incident, the Truman Carrier Strike Group had successfully intercepted two anti-ship cruise missiles and two one-way aerial attack drones with reports of other unmanned vehicles in the air, an official said at the time.
On a day when skies were clear, the Gettysburg commanding officer reported to the Truman Carrier Strike Group commander that “he held no tracks that met unmanned aerial system profiles,” the report says.
In the 40 minutes that followed, the Gettysburg and Truman gave conflicting guidance to the defense aircraft that remained airborne. On orders from the strike warfare commander on watch, the aircraft returned to base. While this was communicated in various ways, it wasn’t understood across the force.
“The process repeated itself nearly verbatim, and [the Gettysburg commanding officer] ordered the launch of a second SM-2 at the aircraft, 5 miles apart from the [first] aircraft, which had begun a left turn in response to the first missile launch,” the report says.
The pilots were rescued and were evaluated and released by medical staff.
The report made 42 recommendations.
“In totality of circumstances … [the Gettysburg’s commanding officer’s] decision to engage was neither reasonable nor prudent, and could have been prevented by action at multiple levels,” the report states.
Contributing: The Associated Press
