Into Iraq’s uncertain political landscape

“That man and coalition forces do not get along,” the 29-year-old from Rome, Ga., tells the occupants, a shrouded, effusive middle-aged woman and a teenage girl remarkable, the soldiers agree, for her sass.

“He’s a bad person,” Hollingsworth concludes.

The girl laughs derisively at the suggestion that she, too, might be a bad person.

“It’s a poster,” she shrugs, dripping attitude as she ignores her mother’s orders to be quiet. Soon, whether she understands the words or not, several of the soldiers and their Iraqi interpreter will start calling her “a bitch.” And the face of Muqtada al-Sadr will not survive the encounter intact.

As U.S. forces pursue the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaida in Iraq, al-Sadr and his Shiite Mahdi Army remain an official enemy, but a quiet one. The militia, known in the U.S. military by the acronym “JAM” — Jaesh al-Mahdi — has largely abided a soon-to-expire cease-fire ordered last summer by al-Sadr, commanders here say, and al-Sadr has been making the noises of a would-be politician.

But commanders here see no reason to believe that al-Sadr, who led a major uprising against U.S. troops from the slums of Baghdad’s Sadr City in 2004, remains anything but a part of their problem. And while commanders see al-Qaida as virtually defeated, in Iraq’s Shiite areas they see a long, nuanced struggle against an enemy that retains significant popular support.

“In my book, the Shiite fight is much more long term than the Sunni fight,” said Col. Tom James, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat team, 3rd Infantry Division, which patrols a mixed but majority Shiite area centered about 30 miles south of Baghdad.

“Those (Shiite) organizations, that’s really Iraq,” James continued, contrasting the Shiite militias with al-Qaida, which is seen as led by foreign fighters. “It’s the internal pieces of Iraq that really fuel that Shiite extremism.”

Al-Sadr has not announced whether he intends to extend the cease-fire, which is set to expire at the end of February, though prominent supporters have urged him to resume fighting. U.S. commanders say al-Sadr’s decision to halt attacks has led to fragmentation within his militia as those determined to continue fighting break away and has produced an opening for rival militias like the Badr Brigade.

Lt. Col. Mike Getchell, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, which operates in the area around Iskandariyah, said the majority of Shiites in the region are aligned with al-Sadr, though very few are involved in militant activities and violence remains low. That could change.

“My personal opinion is that he will lift the cease-fire,” Getchell said. “I think he’s forced to do it as he loses political capital.”

Getchell, 42, of Bridgewater, Mass., said he believes al-Sadr is more likely to direct attacks against rival Shiite militias than against U.S. forces because “he recognizes that we’re not going to be here forever.”

“His longer-term fight is against the other Shiite players,” Getchell said.

Still, Getchell said, fighting between Shiites could easily force U.S. troops to the middle.

“We got caught up in that a lot during [Operation Iraqi Freedom] 1, where we eventually realized that we were just helping to settle tribal scores,” he said. “We don’t want to go back to that.”

Though violence in the Shiite areas here remains low, officers say al-Sadr’s militia remains active.

Capt. Mike Penney, whose Company A of the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment patrols out of a security station in central Iskandariyah, said he’s received reports of JAM members intimidating schoolteachers and moving to take control of local services. Sectarian fighting has reduced the city’s Sunni population from about 40 percent to roughly 20 percent of the total and left only one Sunni mosque standing.

“I think JAM is going to a sort of Hezbollah-in-Iraq type of model,” he said, referring to the Lebanese militia that has established itself as the de facto government of southern Lebanon.

“It’s only a matter of time before they decide whether to fight or not,” Penney said. “But I don’t feel the situation is that fragile. I feel we have room to move forward.”

But progress, officers say, depends critically on the Shiite-led Iraqi government, and on this much-beleaguered front, commanders continue to see few results.

Pre-empting attempts to corner government services requires money to fund those services and repair shattered infrastructure, Penney said. “But we’re seeing next to nothing from the Iraqi government,” he said.

James said money is beginning to flow in, but acknowledged a significant “linkage problem.”

“The money is getting to the province, but it’s not getting out to the local level,” he said. “I don’t know where it goes, but I know the right amount is not getting down to the people where it’s needed.”

According to Getchell, the Mahdi Army has lodged a series of petty complaints against nonsectarian Shiite police chiefs in the province, which the Shiite-controlled Ministry of the Interior in Baghdad has been only too happy to investigate — adding to the widespread belief that the ministry prefers sectarian players.

“Whether they’re being influenced by JAM or by Badr,” he said, “there’s a definite political motivation behind a lot of what they’re doing.”

Like other officers, Getchell said the sectarian rivalries often mean little to average Iraqis. “It’s a competition for power and influence at the political level,” he said.

And at that level, the ambitions remain uncompromising.

“I look around here and what I see is that the Shiites won the first round of this civil war,” he said. “They’ve got the 80 percent solution. But they want the 100 percent solution.”