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YUSUFIYAH, Iraq
The mood in the room turned at the pop of the gunshots. The soldiers at Patrol Base Inchon, about 30 miles southwest of Baghdad, had been joking and bantering. But in an instant they were on their feet, racing up a staircase toward the sound.
A soldier on a balcony had spotted an armed man creeping just outside the earth-filled barriers that ring the small base and repelled him with a volley of shots.
At Inchon, the type of small outpost that is a cornerstone of the recently installed U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, the wire is not far from the front door. U.S. military leaders in the area have embraced the shift in tactic, saying it has helped rein in a sector once commonly known as the “Triangle of Death.”
They also acknowledge, however, the possibility that soldiers may be more vulnerable to attack as insurgents test the patrol bases.
“It’s a hard transition for a lot of units,” said Maj. Robert Griggs of the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division — the unit that holds Inchon and four other company-size outposts. “Units are concerned that the enemy may try to overrun them.”
The regiment arrived in Iraq a few months before the public release of the U.S. military’s new doctrine. The 282-page field manual stressed minimizing the size of bases, making them less intrusive to the local populace and less suggestive of “unduly luxurious living by foreign forces.”
Previous leadership of the U.S. effort in Iraq had placed greater emphasis on placing American forces in large forward operating bases, some the size of small towns, with fast-food franchises and department-store like outlets.
As part of the change in philosophy, more than 50 outposts have sprung up around Baghdad, along with others placed in contentious areas throughout the country like Diyala and Anbar provinces.
Inchon holds little similarity to its larger predecessors. The base, near the agricultural village of Qarghuli, is housed in a large villa. For about a week, Internet service and phones had been down. When the soldiers are not on patrol or piled into their wooden bunk beds, they congregate in a front room that holds a communal television and also serves as the dining hall.
Soon after the base was established, insurgents began testing their new neighbors. In the first months, one convoy came across seven roadside bombs piled outside the front gates. More recently, U.S. officials had gotten reports that a force of more than two dozen insurgents planned to storm the walls.
The attack never materialized but the idea recalls the kind of bold frontal attack that led to the death in late April of nine American soldiers in Diyala province when two trucks rigged with explosives slammed into a patrol base.
“There is an inherent danger,” said Capt. Brent Dittenber, who commands some of the soldiers assigned to Inchon. “A battle position doesn’t solve the problems, but we use it as a starting point. After we hold that ground, we can launch from that point.”
Placing soldiers out among Iraqis facilitates intelligence gathering as locals grow more familiar with U.S. troops, Dittenber said.
“[Soldiers get to] know the local people, they begin to learn who is supposed to be there and they can tell when something is out of place,” he said.
Staff Sgt. Duane Thomas spends 48-hour rotations at another of the regiment’s outposts. The 28-year-old from Little Meadows, Pa., said that the initial push to establish the position was a struggle. “We had a couple of big engagements,” he said. “[Insurgents] did not want us to move forward.”
Since then, however, the area has calmed down, he said. “We’ve only taken a few sniper rounds, some mortars. We’re gaining real estate, taking away supply routes from the enemy.”
But the added benefits of increased interaction between troops and the local population have yet materialize, Brown said.
“I always tell my guys never to trust anybody out there,” he said. “You never know.”
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