Analysts, servicemembers: Special ops only bet for success in Afghanistan
By Mark Oliva, Okinawa
bureau
CAMP FOSTER — American and British special forces in Afghanistan
are refining intelligence and information that satellite images can’t quite get.
“They’re looking for good landing zones and routes for good
mobility when it comes to logistics,” said a U.S. special operations servicemember,
who asked not to be identified. “The hardest thing right now is finding up-to-date,
gridded maps. The men and women in the intelligence community … are putting their
lives on the line to get that information.”
The terrain may be the biggest obstacle, he said. Many of the road
networks in Afghanistan’s mountains are goat trails. Without a decent infrastructure,
the U.S. military mechanized forces are at a disadvantage. This, he said, will be a war
fought on foot.
“We’re going to have to dig into our archives to come up
with a good” battle plan, he said. “We haven’t concentrated enough on foot
movement.”
He cautioned against placing emphasis on mobile warfare, like that of
the Gulf War, where troops were transported in mechanized vehicles to the edge of the
battle. He speculated that Afghanistan is similar to Vietnam, where troops hiked for miles
or were flown by helicopter into battle. Units like the Army’s 10th Mountain
Division, the Rangers and even Marines stationed in Camp Pendleton, Calif., he said, might
be best suited for missions in Afghanistan because of their constant training in rough
terrain.
A political science professor at Pennsylvania State University agreed
that highly trained, special operations teams are the answer to tracking down bin Laden
and his al-Qaida lieutenants.
“U.S. special operations forces will be used for reconnaissance,
raiding and intelligence gathering prior to and during military actions in or near
Afghanistan,” said Stephen Cimbala, author of several college textbooks on
international relations, terrorism and military operations. “Army Green Berets and
Rangers, Air Force Special Operations Wing and Navy SEALs each have different, but
complementary, capabilities to bring to the table. The idea is to get them in, get them
out, get them home with their intelligence or captives or whatever the mission was.”
Special operations soldiers may enlist groups within Afghanistan
opposed to bin Laden and the Taliban regime, such as the Northern Alliance, to gather
intelligence, he said.
“Taliban has lots of enemies in Afghanistan even apart from the
Northern Alliance,” Cimbala explained. “Many of the persons imported by the bin
Laden network from across the Islamic world to fight against the Soviets and then staying
on in Afghanistan to support bin Laden and the Taliban are hated and distrusted by native
Afghanis.”
He said there are several tribes and clans within Afghanistan and
inter-tribal feuding hobbled much of the resistance against the Soviets.
‘It’s a natural fortress’
News reports of British Special Air Services commandos exchanging
fire with Taliban forces appeared within days of the United States announcing its war on
terrorism.
Cimbala said SAS agents might be perfect for the job: They’re
used for infiltration, versed in counterterrorism and know the lay of the land.
“British SAS were inserted early because they have already
trained in the region, know the terrain and have unique capabilities,” Cimbala said.
“Some are probably walking around in the vicinity of Taliban militia units disguised
as Taliban warriors even as we speak. They could be walking around in your office
disguised as reporters or as maintenance personnel, and you would not know.”
One former British Special Air Service soldier told Stars and Stripes
in a phone interview that hunting bin Laden and terrorist cells within Afghanistan would
be difficult, at best.
Tom Carew, author of “Jihad! The Secret War in
Afghanistan,” served with Britain’s 16 Parachute Brigade, 22 Special Air
Services Regiment, behind enemy lines, training Afghanistan mujahedeen freedom fighters
for guerrilla warfare against the former Soviet Union in the 1980s. He also has worked for
the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency.
“It’s a natural fortress,” Carew said of Afghanistan.
“I’m not saying it’s impossible, but it’s going to be tough, you know.
Bear in mind, the place is run down.”
Carew said given the terrain, the weather and the conditions under
which bin Laden and the Taliban are used to fighting, if a strike doesn’t come soon,
it may not be until next April.
“When the snow comes in … I found it very difficult to move
in Afghanistan,” he said. “To hide is a real nightmare.”
Trees and bushes are sparse, Carew added. Hiding in caves is an
option, but caves used by friendly forces are likely to be known by the Taliban.
“The terrain … you can’t dig down very far,”
Carew said. “It’s solid rock and little vegetation.”
Fighting bin Laden
Carew said any force in Afghanistan would fight daily for survival.
Afghans have perfected ambush techniques, he said. It’s the kind of war they’ve
been fighting for nearly two decades, he said.
“Forget conventional forces,” Carew warned.
Carew said the Afghans he fought alongside were competent, but not
exceptional fighters. He said “their soldiering is pretty basic,” and new
technologies, even ones U.S. forces take for granted, such as night-vision goggles, would
baffle the common Afghan foot soldier.
But, he said, they could be especially spiteful, exacting painful and
grotesque vengeance on the enemy.
Carew said elite U.S. and British soldiers would be at a disadvantage
carrying out raids. He said the terrain, the remote camps and nomadic lifestyle of the
foot soldiers combine to hamper movements in or out of a target area.
“Special operations have tried for years to go in and get these
guys,” Carew said. “If choppers come in, they can hear them well off. If you
come in by road, you can see them coming for miles. It’s a nightmare.”
Carew said it’s likely bin Laden has left Afghanistan and is in
Pakistan’s northern territories.
“He has to get the whole world picture, and he’s getting it
from CNN,” Carew said. “He’d be cut off from Afghanistan. And he’s got
to talk, most likely by satellite phone, but that will leave a signature in Afghanistan,
but not in Pakistan.”
Carew said satellite phones and generators are more common in
Pakistan’s northwest region, and virtually non-existent in Afghanistan. Special
forces scanning for transmission and heat signatures from phones and generators could
easily pinpoint a location in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, intelligence forces would need to
sift through multiple signals.
Even if special operations grabbed bin Laden, Carew said, the
repercussions could be enormous.
“It’s a tough situation,” he said. “I think
it’s going to be very hard to go after him, and we’d be better off funding a war
against the Taliban. But even if we got him and took him back to New York to stand trial,
as he should, the effects could be catastrophic. Even if you snatch him, the thing is,
you’ll have every embassy going ‘pop.’”
But getting bin Laden will not be the end of the United States’
work in Afghanistan, Cimbala said.
“The priority mission for U.S. special operations forces once
fighting starts will be to terminate the command of Osama bin Laden,” Cimbala said.
“This does not necessarily mean to kill him or capture him in person. …
Terminating bin Laden’s command means busting up the cohesion and control of his
organization and of the Taliban militias that coordinate with bin Laden.”
Outside sources could prove beneficial to U.S. special operations,
said Dr. Michael Gunter, a political science professor at Tennessee Technological
University and author of books and journals on terrorism.
“I think local special forces — Afghan opposition,
Pakistani, Central Asian,” including from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and/or
Tajikistan, “or Russian — could play potentially a much more important role
because they know the terrain and culture better,” Gunter said.
Conventional forces may have to be used to occupy territory, but this
should be avoided “so we don’t get bogged down like the Soviets did,”
Gunter said. “After all, we are not trying to conquer Afghanistan, just get bin Laden
and his network. But conventional forces must be present and ready if they are needed.
“We will need both forward and rear bases,” he added.
“Forward bases will be most immediately important for special operations. But without
rear bases, the forward bases will not be able to be adequately supplied and
defended.”
A bloody battle
No matter who carries out the mission, Cimbala said, it’s going
to be bloody. American casualties are to be expected.
“I think you’ll see a mixture” of fighting techniques,
he added. “If the fighting is pretty much out in the open, you’ll see it done by
conventional forces. If the objective is in a ravine or on a finger, you’d probably
see artillery or mortars hit it and then someone go in and clean it up. It we go
house-to-house, it’s going to get ugly.”
U.S. forces fighting in Afghanistan can’t underestimate their
enemy, the U.S. special operations servicemember said.
Despite reports of outdated weapons, poor logistics and economic
isolation, many Afghans are loyal to bin Laden and the Taliban, he said.
“These are guys who will fight to the death,” he said.
“They’re not going to give up like the Iraqis. They’ll die for Allah,
without a second thought.”
But, he said, recent political moves to line up coalitions,
especially among Islamic states, will demoralize Muslims fighting a holy war with which no
other Islamic nation is willing to side.
“The bottom line is it’s going to come down to the
heart,” he said.
“I believe the heart of the American soldier will prevail.”
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